

PO7003 Field Seminar B

Political Science

2009-10

Revision date: 13 October 2009

Meeting Time and Place

Friday 10-13:00, College Green 4, starting 30 September 2009. In practice the actual length of the Seminar will depend on the instructor, but normally last just two of the three hours, typically from 10-12:00.

There is a coordinator for the course, Prof. Ken Benoit (kbenoit@tcd.ie) but the seminars are led by a rotating set of staff from Political Science.

Aims and Objectives

The Trinity Ph.D. in political science is designed with the explicit intention of producing rigorously trained, widely read and accomplished political scientists who are able to take their place at once in the forefront of their profession. Students graduating from the programme will be able to read, appreciate, and apply research results on a wide range of themes, well beyond their immediate areas of specialisation. To that end, this course introduces students to substantive material taught by various members of staff. The goal is to expose students as widely as possible to the range of research activity undertaken by members of the Department under the broad rubric of Political Science. These can range from detailed discussions on ongoing research or forthcoming publications, to more methodological and philosophical questions.

Teaching Methods

Seminars: No formal lectures will be delivered. Instead, students should come fully prepared having done the assigned readings beforehand. They will be expected to engage in critical analysis and discussion. Student participation is essential.

Private Study: This will be the most significant part of the course. Careful and rigorous independent study, based on the readings suggested, is strongly encouraged.

Assessment: This would comprise the average grade from 5 short papers written on topics chosen by you. Each short paper is to be handed in one week after the topic has been covered in the course schedule. These papers would typically be around 5 pages each, consisting of critical analysis of the topic and associated readings. The course grade for the field seminar would be a

single grade consisting of the mean of the four best papers plus a 20% participation grade.

Seminar Topics 2009-2010

Autumn

Week 1: (2 Oct 2009):	Ken Benoit – Measuring Policy Positions through Text I
Week 2: (9 Oct)	Ken Benoit – Measuring Policy Positions through Text II
Week 3: (16 Oct)	Gail McElroy – Theoretical Perspectives on Legislative Organization
Week 4: (23 Oct)	Gail McElroy – Legislative Organisation II: Roll Call Voting
Week 5: (30 Oct)	Raj Chari: Interest Groups in the EU
Week 6: (6 Nov)	Raj Chari: Regulating EU Interest Groups
Week 7: (13 Nov)	Reading Week (No class)
Week 8: (20 Nov)	Michael Gallagher - Referendums
Week 9: (27 Nov)	Michael Marsh – Electoral Behaviour I: The Dependent Variable
Week 10: (4 Dec)	Michael Marsh – Electoral Behaviour II: The Michigan Model

Spring

Week 1: (22 Jan 2010)	Jac Hayden – Interview techniques I
Week 2: (29 Jan)	Jac Hayden – Interview techniques II
Week 3: (5 Feb)	Kenneth Benoit – Campaigns and Spending Effects
Week 4: (12 Feb)	Rene Lindstaedt – Competitive Theory of Markets
Week 5: (19 Feb)	Rene Lindstaedt – Market Failures
Week 6: (26 Feb)	Jon Slapin – Strategic Behavior
Week 7: (5 Mar)	Reading Week (No class)

Week 8: (12 Mar)	Jon Slapin – Political Economy and the Role of Government
Week 9: (19 Mar)	Will Phelan – Institutions
Week 10: (26 Mar)	Will Phelan – Institutional Change and Performance

Detailed Reading Lists

AUTUMN

Week 1: Measuring Policy Positions through Text I (Kenneth Benoit)

(See also <http://kenbenoit.net> for a version of weeks with links where you can download most of these readings.)

Budge, Ian, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara & Eric Tanenbaum. 2001. Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945–1998. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Especially Introduction, Chapters 1-4, Appendix II.

Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, Ian Budge & Michael McDonald. 2006. Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990-2003. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Especially Introduction, Chapters 4-6.

Kenneth Benoit, Slava Mikhaylov, and Michael Laver. 2009. “Treating Words as Data with Error: Uncertainty in Text Statements of Policy Positions.” *American Journal of Political Science* 53(2, April): 495-513.

Exercise:

- 1) You must read the [manifesto coding instructions, found here](#) (from Appendix II of *MMP1* and *MMP2*).
- 2) **Code** the test manifesto from this document (Appendix II) as an exercise.

Recommended:

Volkens, Andrea. 2001a. Manifesto Research Since 1979. From Reliability to Validity. In *Estimating the Policy Positions of Political Actors*, ed. Michael Laver. London: Routledge pp. 33–49.

Week 2: Measuring Policy Positions through Text II (Kenneth Benoit)

Required:

Jonathan B. Slapin and Sven-Oliver Proksch. 2008. "A Scaling Model for Estimating Time-Series Party Positions from Texts", *American Journal of Political Science* 52(3), 705-722.

Laver, Michael, Kenneth Benoit & John Garry. 2003. "Estimating the policy positions of political actors using words as data." *American Political Science Review* 97(2):311–331.

Laver, Michael & John Garry. 2000. "Estimating Policy Positions from Political Texts." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(3):619–634.

Recommended:

Budge, Ian and Paul Pennings. 2007. "Do They Work? Validating Computerised Word Frequency estimates against policy series." *Budge and Pennings. Electoral Studies* 26: 121-129.

Benoit, Kenneth and Michael Laver. 2007. "Benchmarks for Text Analysis: A Reply to Budge and Pennings." *Electoral Studies* 26:130–135.

Budge, Ian and Paul Pennings. 2007. "Missing the message and shooting the messenger: Benoit and Laver's 'response'." *Electoral Studies* 26: 136-141

See also: <http://wordscores.com>

Week 3: Legislative Organization: Party Influence (GM)

Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda*. Cambridge: CUP. Part I, Chapters 3,4,7,10&11.

Keith Krehbiel. 1993. "Where's the Party?" *British Journal of Political Science*. 23: 235-266

Lawrence ED, Maltzman F, Smith SS. 2006. Who wins? Party effects in legislative voting *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 31 (1) : 33-69

Aldrich, John H. and David W. Rohde. 2001. "The Logic of Conditional Party Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection." In Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer (eds.), *Congress Reconsidered* 7th ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press: 269-292.

Suggested Reading:

Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Edward H. Stiglitz and Barry R. Weingast, 2009, "Agenda Control in Congress: Evidence from Cutpoint Estimates and Ideal Point Uncertainty." Manuscript. Available at <http://polisci.stanford.edu/faculty/weingast/>

Mayhew, David R. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Week 4: Legislative Organization and Behaviour: Beyond Congress (GM)

Simon Hix, Abdul G. Noury and Gérard Roland. Democratic politics in the European Parliament. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2007.

McElroy, Gail and Kenneth Benoit. 2009. "Party Policy and Group Affiliation in the European Parliament." . Forthcoming *BJPS*.

Yoshinaka, Antoine, Gail McElroy and Shaun Bowler. Manuscript. Rapporteurs in the European Parliament: Partisans or Honest Brokers?

Stephen A. Meserve , Daniel Pemstein and William T. Bernhard. 2009. Political Ambition and Legislative Behavior in the European Parliament. *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 71(3): 1015–1032

Suggested Reading:

McElroy, Gail. 2007. "Legislative Politics as Normal?: Voting Behaviour and Beyond in the European Parliament". *European Union Politics*

Week 5: Interest Groups and Regulating Lobbying (RC)

Frank Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech. 2001. "Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics." *The Journal of Politics* 63(4): 1191-1212.

Burson-Marsteller, 2005. *The Definitive Guide to Lobbying in European Institutions – Based on a survey of the EP, the Council and the Commission* (Spring; valuable analysis from more of a practitioner perspective).

David Coen. 1997. 'The Evolution of the large firm as a political actor in the EU', *JEPP*, 4.1
Justin Greenwood. 2007. *Interest Representation in the EU* 2nd ed. (Palgrave)

Christine Mahoney, 2007, 'Lobbying Success in the US and the EU', *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol 27/1, 44-45

Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson, 2006. 'Interest Groups and EU Policy Making: Organizational logic and venue-shopping' in Richardson (ed.) *Power and Policy Making in the EU* 3rd ed (Routledge)

Silke M. Trommer and Raj Chari. 2006. 'The Council of Europe: Interest Groups and Ideological Missions?' *West European Politics*, Vol. 29, No. 4, 665 – 686, September 2006 (available on my webpage)

Woll C. 2006. 'Lobbying in the EU: from sui generis to a comparative perspective' *Journal of European Public Policy* vol 14. 3, 456-69

Week 6: Regulation of Interest Groups (RC)

Bertók, János. 2008. Lobbyists, Governments and Public Thrust: Building a Legislative Framework for Enhancing Transparency and Accountability in Lobbying. Paris: OECD. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/41/41074615.pdf>

Brinig, Margaret F., Randall G. Holcombe. and Linda Schwartzstein. 1993. "The Regulation of Lobbyists." *Public Choice* 77 (2): 377-384.

Chari, Raj, Gary Murphy, and J. W. Hogan. 2007. "Regulating Lobbyists: A Comparative Analysis of the USA, Canada, Germany and the European Union." *The Political Quarterly* 78 (3): 422-438.

Dinan, William. 2006. "Learning Lessons? The Registration of Lobbyists at the Scottish Parliament." *Journal of Communication Management* 10 (1): 55-66

Greenwood, Justin. 1998. "Regulating Lobbying in the European Union." *Parliamentary Affairs* 51(4): 587-599

Hogan, Murphy and Chari, 'Next Door they have regulation, but not here...', *Canadian Political Science Review* 2(3), September 2008.

Nolan Committee. 1995. *Standards in Public Life, Vol. I, Cm 2850-I HMSO, London*, available at: www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm28/2850/2850.htm

Opheim, Cynthia. 1991. "Explaining the Differences in State Lobby Regulations." *The Western Political Quarterly* 44 (2): 405-421

Public Administration Select Committee. 2009. *Lobbying: Access and Influence in Whitehall*, London: The Stationary Office (available at <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmpublicadm/36/36i.pdf>; along with the Nolan Committee Report above, this will give you a good idea on how the UK has evolved in terms of ideas regarding lobbying laws)

Thomas, Clive S. 1998. "Interest Group Regulation Across the United States: Rationale, Development and Consequences." *Parliamentary Affairs* 51 (4): 500-515.

(Week 7 is Reading Week)

Week 8: The impact of referendums (MG)

Lawrence LeDuc, *The Politics of Global Democracy: referendums in global perspective*. Peterborough Ontario: Broadview Press, 2003

Matt Qvortrup, *A Comparative Study of Referendums: Government by the People*, 2nd ed (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005).

Claes De Vreese (ed), *The Dynamics of Referendum Campaigns: an international perspective* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)

Maija Setälä, *Referendums and Democratic Government: normative theory and the analysis of institutions* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999)

Svensson, Palle (2002), Five Danish Referendums on the European Community and European Union: A Critical Assessment of the Franklin Thesis *European Journal of Political Research* 41/5: 733–50.

Further reading

Bowler, Shaun and Todd Donovan (1998), *Demanding Choices: Opinion, Voting, and Direct Democracy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press). Overview of the USA experience.

Darcy, R. and Michael Laver (1990), Referendum Dynamics and the Irish Divorce Amendment, *Public Opinion Quarterly* 54/1: 1-20.

de Vreese, Claes H. (2006), Political Parties in Dire Straits? Consequences of National Referendums for Political Parties, *Party Politics* 12/5: 581-98.

Lupia, Arthur and Richard Johnston (2001), Are Voters to Blame? Voter Competence and Elite Maneuvers in Referendums, in Matthew Mendelsohn and Andrew Parkin (eds), *Referendum Democracy: Citizens, Elites and Deliberation in Referendum Campaigns* (Basingstoke: Palgrave). (2001), 191-210.

Marthaler, Sally (2005), The French Referendum on Ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty, 29 May 2005, *Representation* 41/3: 230-9.

Michael Gallagher and Pier Vincenzo Uleri (eds), *The Referendum Experience in Europe*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996.

Week 9: Electoral Behaviour I: The Dependent Variable (MM)

Week 10: Electoral Behaviour II: The Michigan Model (MM)

SPRING

Week 1: Michael Marsh – Electoral Behaviour I: The Dependent Variable

Week 2: Michael Marsh – Electoral Behaviour I: The Michigan Model

Week 3: Campaigns and Spending Effects (KB)

Required:

Jacobson, Gary C. 1978. "The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections." *American Political Science Review* 72 (June): 469-91.

2009 (forthcoming). Kenneth Benoit and Michael Marsh. "Incumbent and Challenger Campaign Spending Effects in Proportional Electoral Systems: The Irish Elections of 2002." *Political Research Quarterly*.

Stratmann, Thomas. 2005. "Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature." *Public Choice* 124:135-56.

Recommended:

2008. Kenneth Benoit and Michael Marsh. "The Campaign Value of Incumbency: A New Solution to the Puzzle of Less Effective Incumbent Spending." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4, October): 874-890.

Moon, Woojin. 2006. "The Paradox of Less Effective Incumbent Spending: Theory and Tests." *British Journal of Political Science* 36: 705–721.

Week 4: Rene Lindstaedt – Competitive Theory of Markets

Topics: Supply; Demand; Competitive Markets

Required readings:

- R. Preston McAfee. *Introduction to Economic Analysis*.
<http://www.introecon.com/>, chapters 1-2.

Week 5: Rene Lindstaedt – Market Failures

Topics: Imperfect Competition; Externalities; Public Goods and Free-Rider Problem; Information Asymmetries

Required readings:

- R. Preston McAfee. *Introduction to Economic Analysis*.
<http://www.introecon.com/>, chapter 6.
- George A. Akerlof. 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 84:3, 488-500. [Information Asymmetry]

- Carl J. Dahlman. 1979. "The Problem of Externality." *Journal of Law and Economics* 22:1, 141-62. [Externalities]
- Harold Demsetz. 1970. "The Private Production of Public Goods." *Journal of Law and Economics* 13:2, 293-306. [Public Goods]

Week 6: Jon Slapin – Strategic Behavior

Topics: Rational Choice; Strategies; Equilibria; Simultaneous-Move Games; Sequential-Move Games; Repeated Games; Spatial Models; Principal-Agent Models; Auctions

Required readings:

- Thomas C. Schelling. 2006. *Micromotives and Macrobehavior*. New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton, chapters 1 & 3.
- R. Preston McAfee. *Introduction to Economic Analysis*. <http://www.introecon.com/>, chapters 7.1, 7.4 (except 7.4.3), 7.5 & 7.6.
- Avinash Dixit and Susan Skeath. 2004. *Games of Strategy*. New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton, second edition, chapters 1-2.

Week 7: (Reading Week)

Week 8: Jon Slapin – Political Economy and the Role of Government

Topics: Property Rights; Regulation; Taxation; Public goods; Equity

Required readings:

- Timothy Besley. 2006. *Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government*. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, chapters 1-2.
- Gary Miller and Thomas Hammond. 1994. "Why Politics is More Fundamental Than Economics: Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms Are Not Credible." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6:1, 5-26.
- Peter C. Ordeshook. 1990. "The Emerging Discipline of Political Economy." In: James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds. *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, chapter 1.

Week 9: Will Phelan – Institutions

Topics: Coordination; Cooperation; Communication; Transaction Costs; Constitutions

Required readings:

- Douglass C. North. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, chapters 1-8.
- William H. Riker. 1995. "The Experience of Creating Institutions: The Framing of the United States Constitution." In: Jack Knight and Itai Sened, eds. *Explaining Social Institutions*. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press.

Week 10: Will Phelan – Institutional Change and Performance

Topics: Path Dependence; Credible Commitment

Required readings:

- Douglass C. North. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, chapters 9-11.

- Dino Falaschetti and Gary Miller. 2001. "Constraining Leviathan: Moral Hazard and Credible Commitment in Constitutional Design." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 13:4, 389-411.
- Jack Knight. 1995. "Models, Interpretations, and Theories: Constructing Explanations of Institutional Emergence and Change." In: Jack Knight and Itai Sened, eds. *Explaining Social Institutions*. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press.